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Federal/State Tensions in Fulfilling Medicaid’s Purpose
Abstract

Medicaid has been subject to reconsiderations of the proper role of government in providing for the health
and welfare of populations over recent decades. Over the last decade in particular, a number of states have
transferred many functions that they once performed to private entities, including, in a number of cases,
express policymaking functions. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) takes some crucial
steps towards readjusting the equilibrium of Medicaid. Rather than further prioritizing the market in its
reforms, it gives the federal government stronger charge of Medicaid policy, refocusing the program more
directly on expanding eligibility and providing secure care for beneficiaries in the process. I argue that this
reprioritization is in better keeping with the purpose of Medicaid, in contradistinction to the market-driven
reforms undertaken during the Bush administration and sought by some states today. It does, however, shift
more power from the states to the federal government. This has raised concerns not only from states that
oppose the new health reform law, but also from a number that support it. These two groups of states share a
desire for greater flexibility in their Medicaid programs than the ACA permits. Yet only one of these groups
should be permitted to use federal Medicaid funds to make the reforms they seek. Federal administrations
need to be particularly careful, when considering whether to grant state Medicaid waiver requests, to uphold
Medicaid’s purpose of giving lower-income Americans genuine access to the same health care that other
Americans receive.
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Federal/State Tensions in Fulfilling Medicaid's
Purpose
Laura D. Hermer*
INTRODUCTION

What role ought government to play in ensuring that the people it
governs have the goods and services they need to survive? Politicians
considering this question in recent decades have often concluded that
government's role should be more scant, at least with respect to certain
welfare programs. Rather than ensuring the provision of a particular amount
of goods or level of services and taking part in program administration,
state and local governments have increasingly sought to limit their role to
the provision of funding for welfare services and delegating program
administration and execution to private entities.'
Medicaid has not been immune to these changes. It has become
commonplace for states to contract with private entities to perform
eligibility screenings, manage recipients' care, and handle claims and
queries, among other services.2 It would be one thing if this transfer
* Assistant Professor at the University of Texas Medical Branch. I would like to thank the
participants in the symposium on "Reinventing Medicaid in a Post-Health Reform Era,"

presented by Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Beazley Institute for Health Law
and Policy, where I presented a version of this paper, as well as participants at my

presentations of a version of this paper at Widener University School of Law and Hamline
University School of Law, for useful comments, criticisms, and questions. Any errors remain
my own. I would also like to thank Sheena Eagan, M.P.H., for her able and diligent research
assistance.
1.
See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization,and Power, 74 BROOK. L.
REV. 275, 278-81 (2009) (discussing the transition to greater use of private firms in
providing welfare benefits following the 1996 federal reform of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 591-94 (2001) (same).
2.

See, e.g., MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMMISSION, REPORT TO

CONGRESS: THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGED CARE INMEDICAID 11, 42, 44 (2011), available at
= 1
(finding
http://www.macpac.gov/reports/MACPAC June2011 web.pdf?attredirects=0&d
that 71% of Medicaid beneficiaries nationwide were enrolled in any form of managed care,
with 47% in comprehensive, risk-based managed care plans); ROBERT HURLEY ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING THE INFLUENCE

OF PUBLICLY TRADED HEALTH PLANS ON MEDICAID

MANAGED CARE 1 (2006), available at http://www.chcs.org/usr-doc/Publicly_
TradedHealthPlans.pdf (finding that, as of 2006, nine publicly traded health plans
accounted for 25% of all Medicaid managed care plans and covered one-third of all

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 21

primarily involved routine functions. It often does, but not always. In a
growing number of cases, states are contracting out policymaking functions,
such as the power to determine what benefits Medicaid recipients are
offered or how much recipients pay for services, to private entities.3
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) takes crucial
steps towards readjusting the equilibrium of Medicaid. Rather than further
prioritizing the market in its reforms, it takes stronger charge of Medicaid
policy, refocusing the program more directly on expanding eligibility and
providing secure care for recipients in the process. 4 This reprioritization is, I
will argue, in better keeping with the purpose of Medicaid, in
contradistinction to the market-driven reforms undertaken during the Bush
administration and sought by some states today.
The ACA does, however, shift more power from the states to the federal
government. This has raised concerns not only from states that oppose the
new health reform law, but also from a number that support it. These two
groups of states share a desire for greater flexibility in their Medicaid
programs than the ACA permits. Yet only one of these groups should be
permitted to use federal Medicaid funds to make the reforms they seek.
Federal administrations need to be particularly careful, when considering
whether to grant state Medicaid waiver requests, to uphold Medicaid's
purpose of ensuring that lower-income Americans have genuine,
reasonable, and affordable access to the same health care that Americans of
greater means do.
I will start by briefly examining the purpose of the Medicaid program one which may not be immediately obvious from the language of the statute
Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care plans);

MICHAEL J. MCCUE & MICHAEL H. BAILIT,
ASSESSING THE FINANCIAL HEALTH OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PLANS AND THE QUALITY
OF PATIENT CARE THEY PROVIDE 3 (2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/

%7E/media/Files[Publications/Issue%2OBrief/201 1/Jun/ 511 _McCue assessing financial_h
It Medicaid_managed care_lans ibFINAL.pdf (finding that, between 2004 and 2009, the
percentage of Medicaid recipients in managed care who were enrolled in publicly traded
plans rose from 32% to 41%); MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVICES, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 2-3

(2011), available at http://cts.businesswire.com/ct/CT?id=smartlink&url=http%3A%2F%
2Ffiles.shareholder.com%2Fdownloads%2FABEA-3 IT2WX%2Fl 126235530x0x457630
%2FB4EFC04D-26DA-4EFD-8881-EC 19C3C60FC6%2F2010_MHSAnnual ReportFinal.pdf&esheet-6682662&lan=en-US&anchor=2010+Annual+Report&index=1 &md5
=9030774359447dlaea00f8b6e03fe059 (showing substantial percentage of their business
related to Medicaid administration, and Medicaid radiology, pharmaceutical, and behavioral
health

management);

MEDICAID

JOANNE RAWLINGS-SEKUNDA

PRIMARY CARE CASE MANAGEMENT

ET AL.,

PROGRAMS

EMERGING

PRACTICES

IN

20 (2001), available at

http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/pccmi/report.pdf (finding that six of the eight states in their
case study contracted with private vendors to provide enrollment services for their PCCM
programs).
3. See infra, Part III and associated text.
4. See infra, Part V and associated text.
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and the legislative history, but which can be pieced together with the
assistance of comparison with its predecessor program, the Kerr-Mills Act,
among other evidence. I will then discuss a number of changes to Medicaid
undertaken at the federal and state levels during the Bush and the Obama
administrations, in light of our evaluation of Medicaid's purpose. I will
conclude with some guidelines for providing states with more flexibility in
shaping their Medicaid programs, moving forward from the ACA.
I. CLUES CONCERNING MEDICAID'S ORIGINAL PURPOSE
To some extent, Medicaid's purpose is quite clear. Federal law provides
federal funding for each state "to furnish medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services." 5 This purpose is the one generally accepted by courts,
albeit in a variety of formulations, when considering Medicaid's goals.6
States need not accept those funds, nor need to have any Medicaid program
whatsoever. However, if they choose to do so, they must meet certain
mandatory requirements regarding the populations they serve and the
services they offer, among other matters.7 The program, while an
entitlement for those who qualify, is not limitless. States can, and do, put
restrictions on both mandatory and optional services provided under
Medicaid. 8 There are limits to this flexibility, however, as federal
regulations require that "[e]ach service must be sufficient in amount,
5.
6.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396-1 (West 2011). See also S. REP. No. 89-404, at 1 (1965).
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (Medicaid's purpose is to

"provid[e] federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of

medical treatment for needy persons"); Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir.

2009) (Medicaid's "freedom of choice" principle is consistent with "Medicaid's purpose of
providing health care to the indigent in quantity and quality equivalent to the standard of
care available to the general population"); Three Lower Cntys. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc. v.
Maryland, 498 F.3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 2007) ("The purpose of the Medicaid program is to

enable States 'to furnish... medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent
children ... whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services') (citation omitted); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 511 (8th Cir.
2006) ("Medicaid's goals (are to] provid[e] medically-necessary services, rehabilitation, or

the capability of independence and self-care").
7.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (1)-(3) (West 2011) (providing that state Medicaid

programs must be implemented statewide, that the state must cover the non-federal share of
program financing, and that individuals with Medicaid coverage have an administrative
remedy in the event that their benefits are denied or not provided with reasonable
promptness).
8. See, e.g., ALA.

ADMIN. CODE

r.560-X-6-.14(1) (2011) (limits Medicaid coverage to

no more than fourteen outpatient physician visits per year); 907 Ky.

ADMIN. REGS.

1:019 §

3(7)(a) (2011) (providing for coverage for no more than four prescriptions per month, with

limited exceptions).
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duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose." 9
Medicaid's legislative history provides few clues regarding Congress's
original intentions for the program. As noted in an earlier article, Medicaid
was not the product of substantial legislative deliberation."' Nevertheless, it
is possible to make some inferences based on existing material. In contrast
to its predecessor program, the Kerr-Mills Act, Medicaid's mandatory
baseline requirements suggest that Congress intended to correct some of the
deficiencies of the prior law that helped make the Kerr-Mills Act
unsuccessful in many states in providing health care for impoverished
elderly people."1 The Kerr-Mills Act made states responsible in nearly all
respects for the creation of eligibility standards and benefit coverage. It
specified only that state plans must provide for "some institutional and
some noninstitutional care and services," and "include reasonable
standards.., for determining eligibility" for individuals at least 65 years of
age. 12 Programs differed dramatically from state to state, assuming a state
chose to have a program at all. Those states that already provided a
substantial amount of assistance for the elderly poor took advantage of
Kerr-Mills, while those that provided scant or no assistance for the most
part continued largely as they had before. 13 According to Stevens and
Stevens, only five states provided "comprehensive" services under KerrMills. 14

Medicaid, however, was quite different in several key respects. While it
drew heavily from the language of Kerr-Mills, the federal government
deviated from Medicaid's predecessor by mandating that states choosing to
participate in Medicaid must cover specific categories of people.1 5 It set
mandatory income floors for each set of recipients rather than allowing
states to set lower income limits. 16 The law required states to cover a broad

range of specific benefits rather than merely "some" institutional and noninstitutional services.1 7 States could no longer offer different benefits to one
group of recipients as compared to another; rather, the same standards had
9. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), (d) (2011).
10.
Laura Hermer, Medicaid, Low Income Pools, and the Goals of Privatization, 17
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 405, 407 (2010).
11.
See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 32-36 (Transaction Publishers 2d ed. 2003) (1974); DAVID G.
SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY: 1965-2007, at 40-41 (2008).
12.
Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924, 988-89. See also STEVENS
& STEVENS, supra note 11, at 32.
13.
STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 11, at 33.
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a) (West 2011).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), (a)(17).
17.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a).
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to apply to all recipients throughout the state. 18 Under Medicaid, state plans
still vary, but far less dramatically than they did under Kerr-Mills.
The original Medicaid statute also provided that payments would not be
made to states unless they had, within the first decade of the program,
succeeded in furnishing "comprehensive care and services to substantially
all individuals who meet the plan's eligibility standards with respect to
income and resources, including services to enable such individuals to
attain or retain independence or self care."' 9 While this provision was never
enforced and was ultimately repealed, it strongly suggests an expansive
view of providing care to broad categories of low-income Americans,
bordering on universal access for those who qualify. This broad view was
taken as well by the Johnson administration, which characterized
Medicaid's
ultimate goal [as] the assurance of complete, continuous, family-centered
medical care of high quality to persons who are unable to pay for it
themselves. The law aims much higher than the mere paying of medical
bills, and States, in order to achieve its high purpose, will need to assume
responsibility for planning and establishing systems of high quality
medical care, comprehensive in scope and wide in coverage.20
Rather than taking the tack of the Kerr-Mills Act by deferring to the
states and allowing their desires to prevail, the balance, clearly, was tilted
much more directly toward prioritizing the health care needs of the poor.
Medicaid has been amended in many respects since its enactment. For
example, in 2006, Congress loosened federal Medicaid requirements by
giving states the ability to simply amend their state Medicaid plan to require
certain recipients to enroll in "benchmark" plans, without respect to
comparability of benefits among different categories of recipients or
uniform statewide application, and to raise recipient cost-sharing
substantially above prior limits. 21 But these and other amendments have not
tipped the balance entirely back to prioritizing deference to state
prerogatives over the needs of the populations that Medicaid serves. That
18.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).
19.
Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 350, 350 (1965) (current version at
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West 2011)).
20.
STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 11, at 79 (quoting BUREAU OF FAMILY SERVICES,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS UNDER
TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION supp. D (1966)).
21.
42 U.S.C.A. §§1396u-7(a)(1)(A), 1396o-l(a)-(b) (West 2011). For more detailed
information about the changes to Medicaid made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, see,
e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a PostDeficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 5, 35-46 (2006).
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arguably would have been accomplished, for example, through the
Medicaid Transformation Act of 1995 ("Medigrant"). Medigrant would
have changed Medicaid into a program intended "to provide block grants to
States to enable them to provide medical assistance to low-income
individuals and families in a more effective, efficient, and responsive
manner." 22 It would have expressly recognized and respected the priorities
of each state with respect to the health and management of their low-income
populations, and the financial contribution each state chose to devote to
these purposes.2 3 States would have been given broad flexibility to set their
own standards concerning eligibility, benefits, cost sharing, and other
matters.2 4 The Medigrant bill, however, was vetoed by President Clinton,
and did not become law. Its proposed goals, while invoked since that time
by various parties in different contexts, have never enjoyed the force of law
in any context.
Yet this does not mean that states, and at least one administration, have
not tried to use these goals as the relevant standards to guide the Medicaid
program. The passage of time has obscured many of the original goals for
Medicaid, facilitating the use of others as substitutes. This is unfortunate, as
Medicaid's objectives become particularly relevant when considering not
just the development of the program at the federal level, but also - and
especially - state requests for waivers from federal rules. The history of
disputes between the states and the federal government over the contours of
national and state Medicaid programs is lengthy.2 6 The focus here will be on
more recent events.
II.

STATE PROGRAMMATIC FLEXIBILITY UNDER THE BUSH

ADMINISTRATIONS

In the recent past, particularly during the two most recent Bush
administrations, states have arguably had substantially greater leeway to
alter their Medicaid programs than they ever have before. Many of these
changes were accomplished through §1115 waivers.27 Section 1115 gives
the Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to waive certain
federal Medicaid statutory provisions at a state's request so that the state
22.

Balanced Budget Act of 1995, H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 2100(a) (1995).

23.
24.
25.
26.

§ 2101(a)-(c).
§ 2111 (a).
& MOORE, supra note 11, at 242-43.
For more information about some of these disputes see generally

SMITH

SPARER, MEDICAID AND THE LIMITS OF STATE HEALTH REFORM

MICHAEL

S.

(1996) (discussing variation

in state Medicaid programs through a comparative case study of those of California and New
York).
27.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1315 (West 2010).
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8
may test a "demonstration project" or experiment within the program.2
Without the waiver, the demonstration project would be out of compliance
with federal Medicaid law and hence ineligible for federal matching
finds. 29 The Secretary may grant a proposed waiver only when s/he
believes the state's proposed plan "is likely to assist in promoting
[Medicaid's] objectives. 30 Accordingly, the nature of those objectives
becomes - or should become - quite relevant when considering a § 1115
waiver request. At least one circuit has held specifically on this point that
"the administrative record 'must be sufficient to support the agency
action ... and enable the court to review the agency's decision."' 3 1
As some have noted, it is not at all clear that the Bush administration
adhered to this requirement in some of the § 1115 waivers it granted.32 As
part of President Bush's promise to "make federalism a priority" for his
administration, the HHS developed its Health Insurance Flexibility and
Accountability (HIFA) waiver initiative.33 This initiative sought
applications proposing to expand Medicaid eligibility to populations
earning up to 200% of the federal poverty level, with a focus on using
private coverage to do so. 34 It promised a fast track for applications and

28.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a)(1), (2)(A). See also Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069
(9th Cir. 1994) ("First, § 1315(a) requires that the state project be an 'experimental,

demonstration or pilot' project. The statute was not enacted to enable states to save money or
to evade federal requirements but to 'test out new ideas and ways of dealing with the

problems of public welfare recipients.' Thus, the Secretary must make some judgment that
the project has a research or a demonstration value. A simple benefits cut, which might save
money, but has no research or experimental goal, would not satisfy this requirement. Rather,

the 'experimental or demonstration project' language strongly implies that the Secretary
must make at least some inquiry into the merits of the experiment-she must determine that
the project is likely to yield useful information or demonstrate a novel approach to program
administration.") (internal citations omitted). Section 1115 waivers are distinct from
demonstration projects granted by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMI),
newly enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. For more
information on CMI waivers, see infra, notes 76-80 and associated text.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a)(1), (2)(A).
29.
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a). See also Beno, 30 F.3d at 1070("... [I]n determining that a

state project is 'likely to further the goals of the Act,' the Secretary must obviously consider
the impact of the state's project on the children and families the [public welfare] program
was enacted to protect").
Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 380-81 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Beno, 30
31.
F.3d at 1074).
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of the DisappearingStatute: A Legal and
32.
Policy Critiqueof the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the MedicaidProgram,37
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 131-32 (2003).
Id at 92; Remarks by the President at National Governors' Association Meeting,
33.
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, (Feb. 26, 2001), http://georgewbush0
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/0 2 /2 0 10226-8.html.
See, e.g., Innovative Health Care Options in Medicaid and the State Children's
34.
Health

Insurance Program,

THE

WHITE

HOUSE,

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 21

substantially expanded state flexibility with respect to benefit packages,
cost-sharing, and other features for expansion populations.35
During this time, states took advantage of the new flexibility, some in
dramatic ways. For example, Florida negotiated a waiver permitting it to
allow private health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and provider
service networks (PSNs) in five counties to design "customized," riskadjusted benefits packages among which families and certain other
recipients receiving Medicaid must choose as coverage. 36 Recipients who
fail to choose a plan can only get Medicaid reimbursement for emergency
care, and after a month are automatically assigned to a plan.37 Those with
access to employer-sponsored coverage may opt-out of Medicaid and
receive premium assistance instead.3 8
Evidence suggests that Florida Medicaid Reform has resulted in
substantial dislocations in the market, with severe churning in both plans
and providers. 39 Recipients' satisfaction with both their care and their health
plan declined significantly in the first two years of the demonstration - the
only years for which such data are available. 40 Recipients have been poorly
informed about features of the program, have been unable to obtain care
from prior providers, and unable to get in to see allegedly participating

archives.gov/infocus/medicare/health-care/health-medicaid.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
35.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID AND SCHIP: RECENT HHS APPROVALS
OF DEMONSTRATION

WAIVER PROJECTS RAISE CONCERNS 8-9 (July 2002), available at
CINDY MANN, THE KAISER COMM'N ON
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE NEW MEDICAID AND CHIP WAIVER INITIATIVES 19, 23-24

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02817.pdf;

(Feb. 2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/The-New-Medicaid-andCHIP-Waiver-Initiatives-Background-Paper.pdf.
36.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID REFORM SECTION 1115
DEMONSTRATION:
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, at 1-2, 11, http://www.nachc.
com/client/documents/issues-advocacy/state-issues/ 1115-waivers/FISTC.pdf (last viewed
Dec. 8, 2011). Fee-for-service plans delivered through provider service networks, however,
may not offer "customized" benefit packages. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., FLORIDA
MEDICAID REFORM: 1115 RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION WAIVER 11 (2011), available at
http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/medicaid-reform/pdf/FL 1115 YR_5 FinalAnnual_R
eport 07-01-10_06-30-11 _sent- 11-18-11.pdf.
37.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 36, at 11.
38.
Id. at 10.
39.
See, e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN, supra note 36, at 6-8, 43-45 (noting
entrance and withdrawal dates for plans and providing transition information).
40.

R. PAUL DUNCAN

SATISFACTION:

YEAR

I

ET

AL., UNIV.

FOLLOW-UP

OF FLA.,

SURVEY

37-38

MEDICAID

(2008),

REFORM

available

ENROLLEE

at

http://

mre.phhp.ufl.edu/publications/Medicaid%20Reform%2OEnrollee%2Satisfaction%2 OYear
%200ne%2OFollow%2OUp%20Survey.pdf; see also OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS
& GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, MEDICAID REFORM: LEGISLATURE SHOULD DELAY EXPANSION

UNTIL MORE INFORMATION Is AVAILABLE TO EVALUATE SUCCESS 4 (2009), available at

http://www.oppaga. state. fl.us/Summary. aspx?reportNum=09-29.
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providers. 4' Only 21 have enrolled in the "opt-out" program.4 2 Plans differ
little, if at all, in the benefits they offer.43 Providers left the program in large
numbers after experiencing significant increases in paperwork, lack of
payment, and inability either to obtain authorization to provide necessary
care or refusal to honor prior approvals of care. 44 There have been
documented cost savings in comparison with control counties. However,
those savings are small, and it is unknown, among other factors, how
45
quality of care and access to care have been affected in the process.
The stated goals for the Florida waiver, as originally submitted, have
little to do directly with ensuring that Americans who lack the means to pay
for their health care needs receive comprehensive care. Under Florida
Medicaid Reform, recipients ("Medicaid consumers") are "expected to take
an active role in their health care."4 6 The state's role is to change from one
of "centralized decision maker that creates and manages health care services
to a purchaser of health care services. "A7 Individuals with access to
employer-sponsored insurance can choose to be given a premium subsidy
rather than Medicaid coverage. 48 "Medicaid will move to a premium-based
system and... expenditures will become more predictable. ' 49 The state

JOAN ALKER ET AL., JESSIE BALL DUPONT FUND, FLORIDA'S EXPERIENCE WITH
41.
MEDICAID REFORM:
WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED IN THE FIRST Two YEARS? 5-6 (2008), available at

http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=ccP/o2Opublicatins/state
specific/floridas%20experience%20with%20medicaid%20reform.pdf.

-

JOAN ALKER & JACK HOADLEY, JESSIE BALL DUPONT FUND, As LEGISLATORS
42.
WRESTLE TO DEFINE NEXT GENERATION OF FLORIDA MEDICAID, BENEFITS OF REFORM EFFORT
ARE FAR FROM CLEAR 4 (2011), available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-

filesystem-action?file=cctu/o2Opublications/state-specific/florida-201

/medicaidreform fl

201 .pdf.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY, supra
43.
note 40, at 5.
44. JOAN ALKER ET AL., supra note 41, at 4-5. See also ALLYSON HALL ETAL., HEALTH
FOUND.OF S. FLA., MEDICAID REFORM: BROWARD COUNTY PHYSICIANS' EXPERIENCES 13-15
(2010), available at http://hfsf.org/HFSF/UserFilesUpload/file/Physicians%20Experiences%
20with%20Medicaid%20Reform %20in%20Broward%20County.pdf.
45.
JEFFREY S. HARMAN & R. PAUL DUNCAN, UNIV. OF FLA., AN ANALYSIS OF MEDICAID
EXPENDITURES BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF FLORIDA'S MEDICAID REFORM PILOT

DEMONSTRATION 10 (2009), available at http://mre.phhp.ufl.edu/publications/An%
20Analysis%20of/o2OMedicaid%20Expenditures%20Before%20and%20After%/o2OImpleme
ntation%20of%2OFloridas%20Medicaid%20Reform%2OPilot%20Demonstration.pdf.
46.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 36, at 1; see also FLA.
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., FLORIDA MEDICAID REFORM 3 (2005), available at
http://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/medicaid-reform/waiver/pdfs/medicaid-reform-waiver
-final_101905.pdf.
47. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 36, at 1.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
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expects that these changes will "[i]ntroduce more individual choice,
increase access, and improve quality and efficiency while stabilizing cost,"
and "[i]mprove health outcomes and reduce inappropriate utilization,"
among other less recipient-oriented objectives. 50 Florida's goals for the
program assume that a market-based approach, one that turns Medicaid into
a defined contribution program rather than a defined benefits program and
that subjects recipients more directly to the health insurance marketplace,
will result in better care for recipients. Facially, at least some of these
objectives comport with Medicaid's goals as discussed above. Yet it is clear
that ideological concerns are more pressing, particularly when one
considers Florida's current plans for the waiver, in51 light of the project's
outcomes to date, as will be discussed further below.
Rather than seeking to privatize a portion of its Medicaid program as
Florida did, Vermont received permission through its "Global Commitment
to Health" waiver to operate a state-run managed care program for its
Medicaid recipients, offer a subsidized insurance product or, alternatively,
subsidies for employer-sponsored insurance to lower-income Vermonters
who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid coverage, and expand
enrollment and services beyond those permitted in Medicaid under federal
law.5 2 Chronic care management programs were created to coordinate
primary care for Vermonters with chronic health conditions. 53 In exchange,
it accepted a conversion from open-ended federal funding to a block grant,
which caps the total share of federal funding.54
Evidence suggests this program is working out relatively well for both
Vermont and its residents. The percentage of uninsured Vermonters has
declined since the waiver's inception. 55 The Global Commitment fund,
which funds the premiums for services under Vermont's waiver, had an $80
million balance at the end of FY 201 1.56 Nearly all Vermont physicians
50.
51.
52.
Sheet,

Id.
See infra, notes 113-17 and associated text.
See, e.g., Vermont Global Commitment to Health Section 1115 DemonstrationFact
CTRS.

FOR

MEDICARE

&

MEDICAID

SERVS.,

2-5,

https://www.cms.gov/

20
to% 2
MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGl/downloads/Vermont%20GIobal%2oCommittment%
OHealthcare%2OFact%20Sheet.pdf (last viewed Dec. 8, 2011).
RONALD DEPREZ ET AL., STATE HEALTH ACCESS REFORM EVALUATION, ACHIEVING
53.

UNIVERSAL COVERAGE THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORM: THE VERMONT
EXPERIENCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/publications/

VermontComprehensiveReform.pdf.
54.
Vermont Global Commitment to Health Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet,
supranote 52, at 9.
55. DEPREZ, supra note 53, at 2-3.
VT. LEGISLATIVE JOINT FISCAL OFFICE, REPORT ON MEDICAID FOR FISCAL YEAR
56.
2011, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/jfo/jfc/2011/2011-721/2011_7 21_MedicaidReport.pdf.
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participate in Medicaid, and, in contradistinction to the situation in many
57
states, a substantial majority of them accept new Medicaid patients.
Although 27% of Vermonters participate in Vermont's Medicaid program,
as compared to 20% of Americans nationally, 58 America's Health Rankings
once again ranked Vermont first among all the states in overall good health
in 201 .'9
The terms and outcomes for Vermont's waiver appear to comport well
with the waiver's stated goals: (1) "Increasing access to affordable and high
quality health care;" (2) "Improving access to primary care;" (3)
"Improving the health care delivery for individuals with chronic care
needs;" and (4) "Containing health care costs., 60 On their face, the goals
stated in Vermont's Global Commitment to Health waiver proposal appear
generally to comport with the goals discussed above for Medicaid. Unlike
many of Florida's waiver goals, the emphasis of most of the objectives is on
Vermont's Medicaid recipients and expansion populations, and the effects
that the demonstration project will have on their access to health care and
health care outcomes.
Indiana went a very different direction with its waiver proposal. It
obtained permission from CMS to use, among other revenue sources, a
substantial portion of its disproportionate share hospital (DSH) funds, or
federal supplemental Medicaid funding for uncompensated hospital care, to
instead offer a private, high-deductible health plan with a health savings
account to a limited number of low-income, uninsured adults who do not
qualify for Medicaid.6 '
Preliminary data from the Healthy Indiana Plan (HIP) suggest that it may
work reasonably well for those Indianans who manage to obtain coverage

57.
VT. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 2010 PHYSICIAN SURVEY STATISTICAL REPORT 39 (2011),
available at http://healthvermont.gov/research/HlthCarePrvSrvys/documents/physlObk.PDF
(finding that, in 2010, 72% of primary care physicians accepted new Medicaid patients, and
88% of specialists did).
58.
Vermont: MedicaidEnrollment as a Percent of Total Population 2008, THE KAISER
FAMILY

FOUNDATION,

http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind= 199&cat=4&

rgn=47 (last viewed Dec. 8, 2011).
59.

UNITED HEALTH FOUND., AMERICA'S HEALTH RANKINGS 16 (2011), available at

http://www.americashealthrankings.org/SiteFiles/Reports/AHR%2020 11 Edition.pdf.
60.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GLOBAL COMMITMENT TO HEALTH
SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION: SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, at 2 (2007), available at
ovha.vermont.gov/global-commitment-to-health/vt- 111 5.pdf.

61.
AND

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN: SPECIAL TERMS

CONDITIONS,

at

2

(2007),

available

at

http://www.in.gov/fssa/files/IN_-

HealthyIndiana Plan_(HIP).pdf. The state allocated 40% of its disproportionate share
hospital (DSH) funds to the program. See IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., THE
HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN: SECTION 1115 AFFORDABLE CHOICES DEMONSTRATION PROPOSAL at

41-42 (2007).
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under it. In 2009, only 46,000 of the 365,600 uninsured Indianans earning
less than 139% of the federal poverty level were enrolled in HIP, far less
than the 127,000 Indianans that the waiver application contemplated
covering. 62 While a long-awaited, state-commissioned study examining
recipients' experiences in HIP has still not been released, available data
suggests that a majority of HIP recipients remain in the program, and most
utilized care at least once in the first year of their enrollment.6 3 Yet, HIP has
proved to be inordinately expensive for the state - far more so than the state
contemplated, and more than it would be to simply provide Medicaid
coverage for the same population. 64 Additionally, at least one report found
that, in aggregate, Indiana hospitals received about $7 million more in HIP
funds than they would have in DSH funds, had HIP not gone into effect.65
However, the hospitals receiving business from HIP were not identical to
the ones that would have received DSH funds.6 6 Over half of the hospitals
received no DSH payment in 2009.67 Some of the hospitals were even out
of state.6 8 It appears HIP has resulted in a transfer of funds from some
traditional safety net hospitals, which are the ones that tend to receive DSH
funds, to other non-safety net hospitals.
There are some discrepancies in the stated goals of Indiana's Healthy
Indiana Plan waiver. CMS reported that Indiana sought to "[e]nsure
availability of necessary health services for Medicaid enrollees while
offering health coverage to thousands of uninsured individuals";
"[e]ncourage individuals to stay healthy and seek preventive care"; "[g]ive
individuals control of their health care decisions and incentivize positive
62.

HIP

MONTHLY DASHBOARD DRAFT

(2009) (on file with the author);

THE HENRY J.

KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, INDIANA: HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ADULTS WITH
INCOMES UNDER 139% OF THE FEDERAL POVERTY LEVEL (FPL), STATES (2009-2010), U.S.

(2010), State Health Facts (2012), available at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/
profileind.jsp?cmprgn=l&cat=-3&rgn=16&ind=779&sub=177; IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS.
ADMIN., supra note 61, at Attachment 6, p. 8.
63.
CAROL IRVIN, HEALTH FINANCE COMM'N, HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN: THE FIRST Two
YEARS, at 23, 37 (2010), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/
redirect PubsDB.asp?strSite=PDFs/health/healthylndiana Irvin.pdf.
64. See Hermer, supra note 10, at 419-20 (noting that between January and August of
2009, an average HIP enrollee who did not have a specified, high-cost health condition cost
the state $413/month, and one that did cost $1007/month, in comparison with comparable
Medicaid beneficiaries, who cost an average of $350/month.).
65.
IND. LEGISLATIVE SERVS. AGENCY, ISSUES CONCERNING
HOSPITAL SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENT PROGRAMS UNDER THE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF FAMILY AND SOCIAL SERVICES

22 (2010), available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/publications/2010%20lssues%20Conceming%20Hospital%20
Supplemental%20Payments%20Programs.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. at 22.
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health behaviors"; "[m]ake individuals aware of the cost of health care
services"; and "[e]ncourage provision of quality medical services to all
enrollees." 69 The stated goals appear focused on recipients, and yet they are
rather different from those provided by Indiana itself in its waiver
application. The goals in the Healthy Indiana Plan waiver include
"Promoting Healthier Hoosiers"; "Promoting Personal Responsibility";
"Using Private Market Solutions"; "Promoting System Efficiency and
Quality"; "Promote [sic] Price Transparency by Using Overt, Not Covert
Subsidies"; "Practicing Fiscal Responsibility"; "Helping Hoosier
Businesses"; and "Pro-Work" [sic]. 70 Indiana's stated goals in its waiver
application unguardedly emphasized the importance of the waiver to
private, commercial interests and to the inculcation of recipients in market
practices. As with the Florida waiver, one must stretch to find a correlation
between support and emphasis of the market and improved health care for
lower-income state residents. Depending on the outcome of the
demonstration project, this alleged correlation might be refuted.
III.

A RETURN

TO STRONGER FEDERAL CONTROL UNDER OBAMA

During the two most recent Bush administrations, states moved in widely
disparate directions with their respective Medicaid programs, but this trend
began to change with the Obama administration. Just a few months into its
term, the Obama administration implemented a more centralized vision for
Medicaid by overseeing the creation of the federal Medicaid and CHIP
Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC) in the CHIP Reauthorization
Act of 2009 and expanding MACPAC's mandate under the Affordable Care
Act. 71 MACPAC is charged with examining both state and federal policies
that affect recipients' access to services and quality of care, including
eligibility, enrollment, retention, quality of care, and payment.72 MACPAC
also examines the effect of Medicaid and CHIP policies on health care
access and delivery generally, and makes reports and recommendations to
Congress.73 Ultimately, MACPAC has the potential to offer stronger and
better-informed federal oversight of both Medicaid and CHIP than they ever
previously received.
The Obama administration continued the trend toward increased federal
oversight with the introduction of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA). The ACA will expand baseline Medicaid eligibility to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 61, at 3.
IND. FAMILY & SOC. SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 61, at 9- 10.
9
42 U.S.C.A. § 13 6(a) (West 2011).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)-(E).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(F), (b)(3)(B).
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133% of the federal poverty level for all nonelderly Americans and
qualifying legal residents in 2014; currently eligibility is limited only to
certain categories of people and is often more restricted by income level.74
The ACA offers an expansive vision of Medicaid's role in the country's
coverage universe. It is no accident that half of those who will newly obtain
coverage under the ACA will obtain it through Medicaid.
One can see this as a normalizing and centralizing response to the wide
diversity among each state's Medicaid program's structure and governance,
as well as to the often piecemeal way in which Medicaid has developed at
the federal level. The creation of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Innovation (CMI) under the ACA could be viewed in a similar fashion.
CMI will disburse up to $10 billion from 2011 through 2019 to test a wide
variety of innovations. 75 The criteria for determining the appropriateness of
a CMI demonstration project are better defined than they are in § 1115. The
Secretary of HHS is charged with choosing proposed models "where...
there is evidence that the model addresses a defined population for which
there are deficits in care leading to poor clinical outcomes or potentially
avoidable expenditures," and where the model is expected to preserve or
enhance care while reducing costs.

76

HHS must test each demonstration

project according to specific metrics and make the information publicly
available.77 Judicial review is limited.78 Most notably, however, the statute
gives the Secretary the ability to expand the duration and scope of certain
demonstration projects - even up to nationwide implementation - without
obtaining prior congressional approval. To be eligible for such expansion,
projects must reduce spending without reducing quality of care, or improve
quality of care without increasing spending, and also cannot compromise
benefits for applicable populations. 79 This degree of federal administrative
discretion is unprecedented in Medicaid.
Notwithstanding the generous federal funding for newly-eligible
populations, many states are wary of the new federal Medicaid mandates.
First, there are millions of uninsured residents who will become eligible for
Medicaid under the ACA. 80 Some states will need to absorb a substantial
74. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11- 148, § 2001, 124 Stat.
119, 271 (2010) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West
2011)).
75.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(f)(1)(B) (West 2011).
76.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(2)(A); see also § 1315a(b)(2)(C) (providing additional
factors for consideration).
77.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(b)(4)(A)-(B).
78.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(d)(2).
79.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315a(c).
80.
See, e.g., Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, at Table 2 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at
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number of new Medicaid recipients. Although not all people who become
newly eligible will take up coverage, the current average take-up rate of
sixty-two percent could be exceeded, depending on a variety
approximately
8
of factors. '

It would be one thing if the federal government were to pick up 100% of
the costs of the expansion permanently. It will only do so, however, from
2014 through 2016.82 Thereafter, the federal contribution shrinks until
stabilizing in 2020 at a ninety percent matching rate. 83 Accordingly, states
will ultimately need to pay a portion of the costs, including administrative
expenses, for the newly eligible.8 4 While this will have only a modest
impact on some states, especially for those that already have expansive
Medicaid eligibility, others will be harder hit. Texas is one notable
example. According to the Texas Health and Human Services Commission,
the state will have to pay $27 billion in new Medicaid costs as a result of
the ACA between 2014 and 2023.85 This calculation presumes the take-up
rate for Medicaid among the newly eligible will be over ninety percent, far
in excess of the current average take-up rate. 86 This figure also includes
those individuals who were already eligible for Medicaid, but who have not
taken it up. 87 Additionally, it assumes that Texas will continue to fund the
increase in reimbursement to primary care physicians that the federal
government will fully fund in 2014 and 2015 and will also authorize a five
percent provider rate increase for all specialties.88 The Health and Human
Services Commission report rationalizes - quite reasonably so, if only
Texas applied this reasoning consistently throughout the rest of its
Medicaid program - that coverage is worthless if providers are not willing
to assume care due to perceived inadequacies in reimbursement.
Other analysts have come to a quite different conclusion about the likely
costs of expanding Medicaid in Texas. In a study funded by the Kaiser
http://netadvisor.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2010-03-18-CBO-Letter-to-Pelosi-tricky-

math.pdf.
Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Expansion - The Soft
81.
Underbelly of Health Care Reform?, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2085, 2085-86 (2010).

82.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124 Stat.

119, 272-73 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(y)(1) (West 2011)).

83. Id.
84. See id. Administrative expenses, even for the newly eligible, will continue in most
cases to be matched at 50%, rather than at the increased rate. The increased rate applies only
to health care expenses. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396b(a)(7), 1396d(y)(1) (West 2011).
THOMAS M. SUEHS, TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM'N, FEDERAL HEALTH
85.
CARE REFORM - IMPACT TO TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 7 (2010), available at

http://www.hhsc.state.tx.us/news/presentations/201 0/HouseSelectFedHlthReform.pdf.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 7, 13.
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Family Foundation, John Holahan and Irene Headen found that, between
2014 and 2019, Texas's costs would total only $4.5 billion for the cost of
covering both the newly-eligible and those who were previously eligible for
Medicaid but who did not take up coverage. 89 In this "high participation"
scenario, they assume that seventy-five percent of both the newly- and
previously eligible populations in question take up Medicaid. 90 Ultimately,
they predict that Texas' Medicaid spending would increase by only 5.1%.91
The Lewin Group forecasts an even smaller spending increase of only $4
billion dollars, a four percent increase.92
The problem is that the ACA's Medicaid expansion comes at a time
when many, if not most, states are deeply concerned about their budgets
and the impact their Medicaid programs have on them. While certain
features of the Great Recession and its aftermath are improving, 8.2% of
Americans remain unemployed, and many others are involuntarily working
fewer hours than they would prefer.93 Tax revenues declined sharply during
the period of protracted, high unemployment. 94 Although they have picked
up again in most states, they are forecast nationally to remain over $20
billion below 2008 levels in 2012. 9' Meanwhile, state Medicaid rolls rose
sharply during the economic downturn, and remain quite large. 96 This, in
itself, is problematic. Yet as an additional issue, most states are required to
maintain a balanced budget, and hence cannot incur debt to pay for most
programs funded through general revenue. 97 Medicaid's countercyclical

89.
JOHN HOLAHAN & IRENE HEADEN, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID COVERAGE AND SPENDING IN HEALTH REFORM: NATIONAL AND
STATE-BY-STATE RESULTS FOR ADULTS AT OR BELOW 133% FPL, at 46 (2010), available at

http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/Medicaid-Coverage-and-Spending-in-HealthReform-National-and-State-By-State-Results-for-Adults-at-or-Below- 133-FPL.pdf.
90. Id. at 8.
91.
Id. at 46.
92.
JOHN SHEILS ET AL., THE LEWIN GROUP, THE IMPACT OF THE MEDICAID EXPANSIONS
AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF HEALTH REFORM ON STATE MEDICAID SPENDING 14 (2010),
available at http://www.lewin.com/-/media/lewin/site-sections/publications/lewin impact
of medicaid expansions onstate spending.pdf.
93.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
(Apr. 6, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.
94. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N & NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL
SURVEY OF STATES 44 (2011),

available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/

2011%20Fall%20Fiscal%20Survey%20of/o20States.pdf
95.
Id.
96. JoHN HOLAHAN & VICKY CHEN, KAISER COMM'N ON

MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
CHANGES IN HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE GREAT RECESSION, 2007-2010, at 15

(2011), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/8264.pdf.
97.
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL

FISCAL

BRIEF:

STATE

BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.ncsi.org/documents/

fiscalUStateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf. Note that what different states mean by
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nature invites grave difficulties and difficult choices in state budgets.
When this last happened in 2002, many states made significant cuts in
their Medicaid eligibility standards, services, reimbursement, and other
measures. 9s Thirty-eight states cut Medicaid eligibility in at least one of the
years between 2002 and 2005. 99 The Bush administration refrained from
helping states until late in the recession. 00 In the most recent recession, the
Obama administration quickly offered relief to the states in the form of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).' ' ARRA offered
increased federal Medicaid matching funds, to states that agreed, among
other measures, not to cut Medicaid eligibility from the levels in place as of
July 1, 2008.'02 The baseline Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
enticing for states to consent
(FMAP) increase of 6.2% proved sufficiently
03
to keep their eligibility levels intact.'
ARRA funding was still in place when the ACA was signed on March
23, 2010. The ACA, too, contains a "maintenance of eligibility"
requirement. 10 4 Except under limited circumstances, a state may not reduce
its Medicaid eligibility levels from that in place as of March 23, 2010, until
at least January 1, 2014.1)5 Therefore, between the ARRA requirements and
the ACA requirements, states are locked in to the eligibility levels they had
in place as of July 1, 2008. This would perhaps be acceptable to more states
if the ARRA FMAP increase was still in place, but the enhanced FMAP
"balanced budget" can differ substantially from state to state. Most states (41 states,
according to a 2008 NCSL report) require the budget passed by the legislature to be

balanced. Id. at 4. In a majority of states with such a provision, this means that a deficit
cannot be carried over from one year to the next. Id. at 5. Yet in other states, this might mean
only, for example, that the governor's proposed budget must be balanced. Id.
VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE
98.
CONTINUING MEDICAID BUDGET CHALLENGE: STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH AND COST

CONTAINMENT

IN FISCAL YEARS

2004 AND 2005, at 20-33

(2004),

at

available

http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/The-Continuing-Medicaid-Budget-Challenge-StateMedicaid-Spending-Growth-and-Cost-Containmentin-Fiscal-Years-2004-and-2005-Resultsfrom-a-50-State-Survey.pdf.
99. Id. at 26.
100. See id. at 9.
101.
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12 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d09580.pdf.
102. Id. at 13-14.
103.
See VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
HOPING FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, PREPARING FOR HEALTH REFORM: A LOOK AT MEDICAID
SPENDING, COVERAGE, AND POLICY TRENDS 24 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/

medicaid/upload/8105.pdf. States with high unemployment rates received an even greater
FMAP increase. Id.
104. 42 U.S.C.A. §1396a(gg)(l) (West 2011).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. §1396a(gg)(3).

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 21

ended on June 30, 2011.106 No state to date has reduced its Medicaid
eligibility requirements in direct violation of federal requirements. 107 Their
programs, however, have not been left unscathed. When money is tight,
states must make cuts somewhere.
This time, while a surprisingly large number of states have expanded
eligibility for certain populations during the latest recession and its
aftermath, many have also been putting limits on mandated services, and
cutting provider reimbursement, optional services, and, in a couple states,
eligibility for certain higher-income adults.10 8 Hawaii and Arizona have
most recently proposed placing caps or further caps on covered days of
hospitalization.' 0 9 California has proposed limiting physician visits, on top
of a 10% provider rate cut."0 While eligibility has not been curtailed for
most Medicaid recipients, cuts such as these may have a negative effect on
access to services."'
Yet, these are not the biggest changes taking place. For example, several
states briefly considered, and then discarded, the "nuclear option,"
popularized by the Heritage Foundation in late 2009, of exiting the
Medicaid program altogether. 1 2 A number of other states are considering or
106.

KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, UNDERSTANDING THE MEDICAID
MAINTENANCE OF ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
1 (2011), available at

CHIP

AND

http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8204.pdf
107.
See, e.g., MARTHA HEBERLEIN, TRICIA BROOKS, JOCELYN GUYER ET AL.,
PERFORMING UNDER PRESSURE: ANNUAL FINDINGS OF A 50-STATE SURVEY OF ELIGIBILITY,
ENROLLMENT, RENEWAL, AND COST-SHARING POLICIES IN MEDICAID AND CHIP, 2011-2012 8,

12 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8272.pdf (finding that, during
the study period, only two states reduced Medicaid eligibility, and that both did so in ways
that were permissible under the exceptions to the ACA's maintenance of eligibility
requirements).
108.

SMITH ET AL., supra note 103, at 32.

109.

Phil Galewitz, States are Limiting Medicaid Hospital Coverage in Search for

Savings, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/

2011 /October/24/States-Are-Limiting-Medicaid-Hospital-Coverage-ln-Search-ForSavings.aspx.
110. Id.; see also Associated Press, CaliforniaDoctors Sue Government Over Medi-Cal
Cuts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE

(Nov. 21,

2011), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/

2011 /nov/21/calif-doctors-sue-government-over-medi-cal-cuts/.
111.
See, e.g., JoAnne Young, MedicaidProviders Warn Rate Cuts Would Have Dismal
Consequences, LINCOLN
JOURNAL
STAR
(Mar.
15,
2011,
7:30
PM),
http://journastar.com/news/unicameral/article-fdd38430-73bc-56ac-90b6-46d6425a957b
.html; Darren Barbee, Texas May Cut Medicaid Reimbursements to Healthcare Providers,
STAR-TELEGRAM.COM (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/11/20/3540533/
texas-may-cut-medicaid-reimbursements.html#tvg.
112.
Dennis Smith, a former director of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services under George W. Bush, proposed that states opt-out of Medicaid in a Heritage
Foundation paper. Dennis G. Smith & Edmund F. Haislmaier, Medicaid Meltdown:
Dropping Medicaid Could Save States $1

Trillion, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2009),

http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf media/2009/pdf/wm2712.pdf. A number of states, including
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attempting less dramatic but still significant changes. For instance, Florida's
legislature approved an expansion of the demonstration program described
earlier to the entire state, and is presently waiting for CMS to approve or
deny a corresponding waiver." 3 While it approved a continuation of the
existing five-county demonstration described above, CMS imposed new
standards concerning medical loss ratios, benefit standards, and costsharing.' 1 4 It is uncertain whether CMS will approve the statewide
expansion and, if so, in what form. 1 5 Placing recipients - even frail, elderly
recipients - into HMOs is one thing. Most states have taken to using
managed care for most of their Medicaid populations, and there is even a
trend toward doing so for those who are eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid, who tend to be among the frailest and sickest people Medicaid
serves.11 6 Yet, as noted earlier, Florida's demonstration project also gives
private health insurers discretion to alter or even eliminate benefits that
would otherwise be mandatory." 7 This step moves beyond even the
discretion given to states under the Deficit Reduction Act to offer
"benchmark" plans to specific Medicaid populations.'" 8 Under the Deficit
Reduction Act, the state is still ultimately in charge of determining benefits.
Florida's proposed waiver, however, would cede that control to private
insurers. In all, Florida's program currently represents one of the more
Texas, Nevada, and Wyoming, went so far as to study the issue following the paper's
publication. See, e.g., STRATEGIC DECISION SUPPORT, TEX. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS. COMM'N, IMPACT ON TEXAS IF MEDICAID IS ELIMINATED (2010), available at
www.hhsc.state.tx.us/hb-497_122010.pdf, NEV. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. &
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND POLICY, MEDICAID OPT-OUT (2010), available at
http://media.lasvegassun.com/media/pdfs/blogs/documents/2010/01/28/medcaid0128.pdf;
Wyo. DEP'T OF HEALTH, MEDICAID OPT-OUT IMPACT ANALYSIS (2010), available at
www.health.wyo.gov/Media.aspx?mediald=9529.
Lizette Alvarez, FloridaLegislators Pass H.M.O. Planfor Medicaid, N. Y. TIMES
113.
(May 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/us/07florida.html.
114.
Carol Gentry, Medicaid Waiver Coming Soon, with Patient Protection Rules,
HEALTH NEWS FLORIDA (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.healthnewsflorida.org/hnf stories/
read/medicaid waiver comingsoonwith-patientprotection rules.
CMS denied the portions of the plan seeking to impose a $10 premium on most
115.
Medicaid beneficiaries and a $100 co-payment on all beneficiaries eligible for Medicaid
under the waiver who make non-emergent use of emergency department services. Letter
from Victoria Wachino, Director, Family and Children's Health Programs Group, CMS, to
Justin Senior, Deputy Secretary for Medicaid, State of Florida, Feb. 9, 2012, available at
http://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/statewidemc/fsdocs/Finalsigned FL amend_02-0912.pdf.
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE:
116.
KEY DATA, TRENDS, AND ISSUES 1, 3-4 (2010), available at www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/8046.pdf (finding seventy-one percent of beneficiaries in managed care as of 2008,
and that nearly one-third of dual-eligibles received at least some services via managed care).
117. See supra,note 37 and associated text.
118. See supra,note 21 and associated text.
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pronounced grants of power to private interests in Medicaid. The state has,
in the process, expressly sought to become merely a funder of services with
certain quality oversight functions. 119
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has agreed to review the 11 th Circuit's
decision in Florida v. HHS, regarding the constitutionality of the ACA's
Medicaid expansion. 120 The 26 state appellants claimed that the expansion
of Medicaid eligibility to Americans and qualifying legal residents earning
no more than 133% of the federal poverty level constitutes unconstitutional
coercion in a grant-in-aid program. 21 They argue that the ACA gives them
a Hobson's choice of either accepting an allegedly "radically changed"
Medicaid program, or leaving the program altogether while nevertheless
continuing to have their residents' tax dollars used to support other states'
Medicaid programs. 122 The state appellants want far more flexibility to
determine the priorities of their Medicaid programs than the statute
allows. 123 They argue that if the federal government wants states to
accomplish certain ends with their Medicaid programs, Congress ought to
"encourage[] rather than force[]" states to act accordingly. 124 A new
mandate such as the ACA's Medicaid expansion, in the context of a
program as large and costly as Medicaid, amounts to an unconstitutionally

119.

As in its original waiver application, Florida forthrightly expressed its desire to

fund rather than direct care in its application for a statewide expansion of its current
demonstration program. FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., STATEWIDE MANAGED
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: 1115 RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION WAIVER 4 (2011),

availableat http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/statewide mc/fsdocs/Amendment 11115
MedicaidReform Waiver 0801201 l.pdf ("The State's role has changed so that it is largely
a purchaser of care, providing oversight focused on improving access and increasing quality
of care"); FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., FLORIDA MEDICAID REFORM:
APPLICATION FOR 1115 RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION WAIVER 3 (2005), available at

http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/medicaidreform/waiver/pdfs/medicaid reform waiver
_083005.pdf ("Under Medicaid Reform, the state's role will change so that it is largely a
purchaser of care..."). Other states, such as Wisconsin, are also considering some
substantial and limiting changes. See, e.g., Jason Stein, State Wants to Shift Some Medicaid
Recipients to

Lower-Cost Plans,

JOURNAL

SENTINEL

(Sept.

30,

2011),

http://

www.j sonline.com/news/statepolitics/walkers-administration-to-announce-pIan-to-cut-444million-from-medicaid- 130853728.html.
120. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S.Ct. 604 (2011) (mem.).
121.
Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1264 (1 lth Cir. 2011).
122.
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at *19,
2010 WL 4564355, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. HHS, Case No. 3:l0-cv-91-RV/EMT.(N.D.
Fla.Nov. 4, 2010); Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 21-24, 33-39, Florida v. HHS,
No. 11-400 (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/supreme courtpreview/briefs/l 1-400_petitionerstate.pdf.
123.
See, e.g., Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, supra note 122, at 7-8.
124.
Id. at 24.
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"extreme and unprecedented abuse of Congress' spending power."'' 25 Such
arguments, while certainly not identical, fit hand-in-glove with ones made
by the Republican Governors' Association, in which many of the same
states participate, to turn Medicaid into a block-grant program. 126 Blockgranting Medicaid would give states a fixed amount of federal funding.
Leading states to have greater discretion than under the current Medicaid
program in choosing how27to fund some health coverage or care for some
low-income populations. 1

At the other end of the spectrum, Vermont, Oregon, and Montana are
each, in their own ways, seeking not to expand Medicaid per se, but rather
to transform their entire state health care systems into universal or nearuniversal, single-payer coverage with integrated care delivery. Vermont's
proposed system, "Green Mountain Care," will establish single-payer
coverage for all state residents except those working for employers who
offer a self-insured health plan. 128 The program would be administered
either by the state, or through public-private partnerships. 129 The plan would
require Medicaid, Medicare, and ACA waivers from the federal government
for all Vermonters, including
to both fund and administer health coverage
30
Medicaid.
and
Medicare
for
those eligible
While Vermont is the only state to date that has successfully enacted
single-payer legislation, other states, such as Oregon and Montana, may be
moving toward doing so as well. Legislators in Oregon continue to push for
"Affordable Health Care for All," which would establish public, tax-funded
health coverage for all Oregonians. 131 In the meantime, the state will be
seeking permission from CMS to move its Medicaid program toward a
"coordinated care" model, which would use a team- and community-based
approach to delivering health care to enrolled Medicaid recipients under a
global budget. 132 Montana's plan is perhaps the most inchoate of the three.

125.
Id. at 23.
126. See, e.g., Letter from the Republican Governors Ass'n to Rep. Paul Ryan (Apr. 5,
2011) (on file with author), available at http://www.rga.org/homepage/rga-leadershipsupports-house-gop-budget-calls-for-medicaid-block-grants/.
127.
See, e.g., Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block-Grant Program, 83
MILBANK Q. 41, 41-42 (2005).
128. Act of May 26, 2011, No. 48, § 2(a)(1), 2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves 1, 8, available
at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2012/Acts/ACT048.pdf
129. See VT. STAT. Ann. tit. 33, § 1827 (West 2011).
130. Act of May 26, 2011§ 2(a)(1); tit. 33, §§ 1822(b), 1827(g), 1829(b)(2).
131.
See H.B. 3510, 76th Legis. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011).
132.
Or. Rev. Stat. §414.625(1) & (2) (2012). See also, e.g., Jonthan J. Cooper, On
Health Care, Oregon Picks up where Obama Left Off ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 6, 2012),
at
http://news.yahoo.com/health-care-ore-picks-where-obama-left-offavailable
092411788.html.
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In public form, it currently consists largely of some comments by Governor

Schweitzer lambasting the ACA, and asserting that Montana will instead
seek to establish a universal, single-payer system resembling that in the
Canadian province of Saskatchewan.' 33 The governor said the state is
working on relevant waiver requests to CMS now, and that he expects the
state to finish preparing and submitting the waivers in the next few
months.

134

IV.

CONCLUSION

One might wonder if much of the rhetoric at the state level is largely
driven by a desire to extract more money and concessions from
Washington. But it would likely be a mistake to think that this is all that is
going on. Rather, it appears instead that many states believe the
transformational potential of the ACA is limited, and that it puts
inappropriate limits on state prerogatives. While the ACA substantially
increases federal control over state health affairs on a variety of fronts, the
ACA's acceptance of the status quo, with a few notable exceptions with
respect to health care finance and delivery clearly has left many states
disappointed. Congress, moreover, is unlikely to be able to deal
responsively to states' concerns, at least in the near future. Lacking the
federal leadership they desire, some states are seeking to forge their own
paths.
Although federalizing Medicaid could be a good idea, it is unlikely that
Medicaid will be federalized anytime in the near future. 135 In the absence of
federalization, we will need to continue to deal with struggles between the
federal and state governments over Medicaid policy and funding. It is
difficult under such circumstances to responsibly advocate that states like
Texas, Florida and Indiana should, for example, be given largely unfettered
leeway to further limit and privatize their programs, as they likely would if
given a block grant, or, to a lesser but still substantial extent, if the
standards employed by the Bush administration were used to evaluate
waiver applications they might submit. The goals of Medicaid ought not to
include such novelties, and with good reason. As discussed earlier,
133.
Mamee Banks, Schweitzer Wants Universal Health Care for Montana, KRTV
(Sept. 28, 2011, 5:11 PM), http://www.krtv.com/news/schweitzer-wants-universal-healthcare-for-montana/.
134.
Id.
135.
See, e.g., Nichole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431,
473-84 (2011) (detailing reasons to completely federalize the program); Michael Birnbaum,
The Landscape in 2009: A Conversation with Bruce C. Vladeck, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 401, 411 (2009) (arguing for a reallocation of federal and state responsibility in Medicaid,
though not for complete federalization).
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Medicaid is supposed to be about furnishing "medical assistance on behalf
of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs
of necessary medical services."' 36 It is about providing comprehensive
medical care for those who need it the most, yet have the least resources
with which to do it. Nothing in the statute would suggest that we should,
instead, allow states to place inordinate limits on eligibility and coverage, or
to transfer even more programmatic design, oversight, and concordant
public funding from the state to private entities. States wanting to use
Medicaid dollars for such purposes have, as they always have had, the
option to create their own, wholly state-funded programs.
Rather, as a matter of policy, federal administrations should encourage
Medicaid demonstration projects that further Medicaid's recipient-oriented
goals. The ACA provides a sound floor for the Medicaid program, with its
substantial eligibility enlargement. The federal government should allow
states with expansive and inclusive visions for their health care systems to
build upon it. States such as Vermont should accordingly be permitted to
use Medicaid funds to rationalize and simplify their health care systems in
the process of expanding coverage and coordinating care delivery for all
residents. Other measures should also be prioritized, such as plans to
establish greater equity in provider reimbursement between Medicaid and
other forms of coverage to help break down disparities in health care access
between Medicaid recipients and other state residents. Although we might
not see further legislation enacted at the federal level to expand upon the
ACA in the short term, the administration should assist those states that
wish to do so within their own borders, consistent with an expansive vision
of Medicaid's purpose.
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42 U.S.C.A. § 1396-1 (West 2011).
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